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COMMENT
THE HMO'S ANGLE IN THE "PARTICIPANT
TRIANGLE": WHAT'S SO WRONG WITH
NIGERIA'S HEALTH INSURANCE SCHEME?
I. INTRODUCTION
Nigeria, a nation under scrutiny by the international community for
its many questionable human rights practices, 1 is at the dawn of a new
day. Historically, Nigeria, a country in which "people die daily as a result
of inaccessibility to health facilities" primarily due to under-funding, has
customarily spent less than three percent of its total expenditure on
healthcare.2 This percentage is a far cry from the World Health
Organization's ("WHO") recommended minimum health expenditure of
fifteen percent.3 The decrepitude of Nigeria's healthcare is evidenced by
the routine migration of affluent Nigerians overseas for their medical
problems while the domestic health institutions continue to decay.4
Additionally, the deputy governor of Nigeria's Bauchi State government,
once commented that the same dilapidation in the country's health
1. Richard Joseph, Democratization under Military Rule and Repression in Nigeria, in
Dilemmas of Democracy in Nigeria 137, 137-39 (Paul A. Beckett & Crawford Young eds., U.
of Rochester Press 1997) (human rights abuses included "[arbitrary arrests and
detentions, extrajudicial killings, endemic corruption.... torture of detainees....
imprisonment without charge or trial, harassment of journalists and democratic activists,
corruption of the judiciary, arson attacks on media houses, seizure of passports"). Under
General Sani Abacha's five year military regime (1993-1998), Nigeria was deemed "one of
the world's most oppressed nations." Id. The United States, the European Union, and
other governments accused the Abacha government of serious deviation from "the most
basic international nons and universal standards of human rights." Id. at 137, 152 n. 1.
See generally Amnesty International, Nigeria Time to End Contempt for Human Rights
<http://www.anmesty.org/ailib/intcam/nigeria/contoc.htm> (accessed Nov. 1996).
2. Ifeanyi Ugwuadu, Making the National Health Insurance Scheme Work, Africa News [
8] (Sept. 6, 2000) (available in LEXIS, NEWS library, AFRNWS file) [hereinafter Ugwuadu,
Making the NHIS Work]; What Hope for Health Sector in 2002?, Africa News j 1, 51 (Jan. 4,
2002) (available in LEXIS, NEWS library, AFRNWS file).
3. What Agenda for the Sick?, Africa News [ 9 7, 101 (July 6, 1999) (available in LEXIS,
NEWS library, AFRNWS file).
4. Chuwo Avre, Baucht to Hunt for Egyptian Medical Doctors, Africa News [9 3]
(Aug. 18, 2000) (available in LEXIS, NEWS library, AFRNWS file).
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institutions also causes Nigerian doctors to run overseas to work.5
Despite Nigeria's virtually nonexistent national healthcare delivery
system,6 the awaited implementation of the National Health Insurance
Scheme ("NHIS")7 provides some light at the end of a dismal tunnel.8
Prior to 1999, Nigeria had been under military rule for the preceding
fifteen years. 9 The NHIS was decreed by the military government in May
of 199910 in response to Nigeria's healthcare troubles."l The NHIS
provides for an intricate mechanism purposed to curb the cost of
healthcare while improving the accessibility and quality of health
services. 12  In its most elementary form, the Scheme13 could be
conceptualized as creating a "participant triangle"14 consisting of insured
persons, health maintenance organizations, and healthcare providers-
all of whose actions are government regulated. 15
5. Id.; George Onah, Exodus of Doctors Blamed on Poor Salary, Africa News 19 11 (Aug.
18, 2000) (available in LEXIS, NEWS library, AFRNWS file) [hereinafter Onah, Exodus of
Doctors] (stating that "[t]he continued exodus of medical doctors from the services of the
federal and state governments has been traced to the poor condition of service offered
doctors in the country"). Nigerian doctors do not generally enjoy the financial rewards
their American counterparts do. 2001 Health Budget- Old Wine in New Skin, Africa News
(Dec. 13, 2000) (available in LEXIS, NEWS library, AFRNWS file) (stating that the lack of
pay increases for government doctors prompted their 2000 strike). In 2001, Nigerian
"[doctors embarked on an 18-day strike, seeking better remuneration [sic]." What Hope for
the Health Sector in 2002?, supra n. 2. Many healthcare workers refused to work, therefore
debilitating Nigeria's healthcare sector which resulted in many deaths. Id.
6. See J. Marsteller & M. Cohen, Off. of Africa, U.S. Dept. of Com., The Health Care
Sector in Sub-Saharan Africa, Mkt. Rpts. (Aug. 1, 1992) (available in LEXIS, MARKET
library, MKTRPT file).
7. National Health Insurance Scheme, Decree No. 35 (May 10, 1999) (Nig.)
<http://www.nigeria-
law.org/National%2OHealth%2OInsurance%2OScheme%2ODecree.htm> [hereinafter NHIS].
For purposes of this article, "NHIS" refers to the actual text of the legislation.
8. See generally Iyefu Adoba, National Health Insurance Scheme Begins in Ushaffa,
Africa News (Nov. 27, 2000) (available in LEXIS, NEWS library, AFRNWS file); Peter
Egwuatu, Federal Government Urged to Implement Health Insurance Scheme, Africa News
(Dec. 22, 2000) (available in LEXIS, NEWS library, AFRNWS file); Ifeanyi Ugwuadu,
Stakeholders Disagree over Control of Health Insurance Providers, Africa News (Nov. 16,
2000) (available in LEXIS, NEWS library, AFRNWS file) [hereinafter Ugwuadu, Stakeholders
Disagree]; Health Insurance Scheme Takes Off Soon, Africa News (Oct. 9, 2001) (available in
LEXIS, NEWS library, AFRNWS file); Nigerians Waitfor Health Insurance, Africa News (Sept
5, 2000) (available in LEXIS, NEWS library, AFRNWS file).
9. Thomas H. Reynolds & Arturo A. Flores, Foreign Law: Current Sources of Codes and
Basic Legislation in Jurisdictions of the World, III Nig. 2-3 (AALL Publications Series No.
33-2000 release, Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1993).
10. NHIS, at Preamble, <http://www.nigeria-
law.org/National%2OHealth%2Onsurance%2OScheme%2ODecree.htm>.
11. Supra n. 8.
12. How It Will Work, Africa News (Sept. 5, 2000) (available in LEXIS, NEWS library,
AFRNWS file).
13. For purposes of this article, "Scheme" refers to the administrative infrastructure the
NHIS creates.
14. Term coined by the author as an illustrative phrase describing the closed nature of
the Scheme's application. Use of this term is in no manner intended to oversimplify the
complicated operation of the Scheme.
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In light of this expansive new healthcare endeavor, one would be
hard pressed to ignore Nigeria's unstable economy and its current
shambled infrastructure. 16 Therefore, from the outside looking in, it may
appear that healthcare delivery, managed care, and national health
insurance should be the last item on the government's agenda. In a
nation where telephones and uninterrupted electricity are luxuries
secured by a small minority,17 it may seem inappropriate for the
government to permit an expansive national healthcare scheme to take
precedence over what developed nations would consider bare necessities.
One may additionally argue that foundational groundwork-maintenance
of clean running water for example-must first be established throughout
Nigeria before the government can embark upon complicated healthcare
schemes. 18 The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights19 provides credence to this argument. The Convention recognizes
that everyone has a right to "the enjoyment of the highest attainable
standard of physical... health" and establishes that in order to achieve
that end, a country should "[improve] all aspects of environmental and
industrial hygiene... [and create] conditions which would assure to all
[its people] medical attention in the event of sickness."2 °
Whether Nigeria has met these standards is outside the scope of
this Comment's inquiry; nonetheless, the language of the Convention
provides some credibility to the arguments of critics who oppose
implementation of the Scheme. The scope of this Comment, however,
will focus upon a discussion of the provisions within the Scheme that
create the "participant triangle" and the possible affects these provisions.
may have on Nigeria's healthcare sector. In light of Nigeria's newly
implemented democratic government2' and its turbulent economy,22 this
inquiry will also examine the feasibility of utilizing health maintenance
organizations ("HMOs") within Nigeria's proposed healthcare delivery
system. The arguments presented within this Comment are made in the
context of legal issues currently plaguing the healthcare delivery system
16. Nigeria: Social Conditions, PRS Group Pol. Risk Serv. (Nov. 1, 1999) (available in
LEXIS, WORLD library, PRSRPT file); Reynolds & Flores, supra n. 9, at III Nig. 2.
17. Nigeria: Social Conditions, supran. 16 (stating that the vast majority of Nigerians live
in extreme poverty and shortages of water, power, and telephone service are common); see
generally Peter Lewis, Politics and the Economy: A Downward Spiral, in Dilemmas of
Democracy in Nigeria 303, 303-22 (Paul A. Beckett & Crawford Young eds., U. of Rochester
Press 1997).
18. What Hope for Health Sector in 2002?, supra n. 2, at [1 51.
19. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 12 (adopted by
U.N. Dec. 16, 1966; signed by Nigeria Jul. 29, 1993),
<http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/b2esc.htm>.
20. Id. (emphasis added).
21. Office of Director of Central Intelligence, CIA-The World Factbook 2001: Nigeria
<http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ni.htnil> (accessed Feb. 8, 2002).
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in the United States. Because managed care has become so deeply
entrenched within the American system,23 the dilemmas that have arisen
from its use provides a helpful mechanism in which to foreshadow the
success of the "participant triangle" in Nigeria's healthcare delivery
system.
A. Arguments Presented
The crux of arguments presented in this Comment establishes that
upon implementation of the 1999 version 24 of the NHIS, the "participant
triangle" would: (1) preclude the majority of Nigerians from partaking of
Scheme-provided benefits and (2) produce an environment within the
"participant triangle" which may give rise to American-like managed care
woes. In light of the NHIS's stated purpose to provide quality healthcare
to a! Nigerians, the Nigerian government would be more likely to
accomplish this goal and better serve the Nigerian people by
implementing programs similar to those instituted by the United States'
Hill-Burton Act25 and Health Maintenance Organization Act ("HMO
Act").
26
Part II of this Comment discusses the political and legal history of
Nigeria in order to provide a context in which the NHIS was
implemented. Part III provides a general description of the current state
of Nigerian healthcare. Part IV summarizes the overall workings of the
Scheme and establishes the creation of the "participant triangle." Part V
establishes the exclusivity of the "participant triangle" and discusses the
contradictory nature of relevant NHIS objectives. Part VI briefly
discusses managed care in the United States. Part VII discusses the role
of HMOs in the "participant triangle" and the impact NHIS provisions
have upon their viability. Part VIII explores alternatives to implementing
the NHIS -specifically implementation of legislation similar to the
United States' Hill-Burton Act. Although the creation of the "participant
triangle" gives rise to many issues concerning its individual players, the
inquiry of this Comment is limited to a discussion of Scheme-registered
HMOs.
23. Barry R. Furrow et al., Health Law 464 (2d ed., West 2000) ("In 1998, 34% of
enrollees in employer-sponsored group health plans were insured through PPOs, 30%
through HMOs, 22% through Point of Service plans, 14/ through fee-for-service plans with
utilization management.").
24. See infra nn. 53-59 and accompanying text. The purpose of this article is to identify
and analyze the flaws in the text of the 1999 NHIS. Because this statute gives rise to a
myriad of problems, it is highly unlikely that the Scheme will be implemented based on
this version. However, the Nigerian legislature has not yet passed new legislation that
supercedes the 1999 NHIS.
25. 42 U.S.C.A. § 291 et seq. (West 2001).
26. 42 U.S.C.A. § 300e (West 2001).
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II. NIGERIA'S PoLITIcAL & LEGAL HISTORY
The Republic of Nigeria is the most populous African nation27 and
the world's seventh largest oil exporter. 28 A descendant state of many
ancient native kingdoms, Nigeria is presently a federation of thirty states
and a federal capital territory.29 Nigeria's troubled political history has
its roots in its colonial past in which colonial administrators, for the
sake of simplicity, formed boundaries encompassing an extremely
ethnically diverse population consisting of some 250 ethnic groups.3 °
The consolidation of such diversity arguably gave rise to a history of
governmental instability after Nigeria's 1960 independence from Great
Britain.31  Within its relatively short history as a nation, Nigeria has
already suffered through several constitutions, a civil war, and several
military coups leading to military regimes. 32 In fact, in Nigeria's forty-
one years as an independent and sovereign nation, the military has been
in power for nearly thirty-two of those years.3 3
Political instabilityl and notorious widespread corruption within
27. CIA, supra n. 21 (estimating a population of 126,635,626 in July 2001 with a
population growth rate of 2.61%). Nigerians make up 25% of Africa's total population.
Paul 0. Chuke, Nigeria, in The International Handbook of Health-Care Systems, 229, 230
(Richard B. Saltman ed., Greenwood Press 1988) (stating that "every fourth African is a
Nigerian").
28. Nigeria: Equity Restrictions, PRS Group Pol. Risk Serv., Geography sect., [9[ 1] (Nov. 1,
2000) (available in LEXIS, WORLD library, PRSRPT file). Nigeria is a land rich in natural
resources: petroleum, natural gas, tin, columbite, coal, limestone, lead, zinc, and arable
land. CIA, supra n. 21.
29. Reynolds & Flores, supra n. 9, at III Nig. 1.
30. Id. at III Nig. 2; Funso Afolayan, Nigeria: A Political Entity and a Society, in Dilemmas
of Democracy in Nigeria 45, 45-60 (Paul A. Beckett & Crawford Young eds., U. of Rochester
Press 1997) (providing an in depth discussion of Nigeria's ethnic cultures).
The majority of the nation is comprised of three ethnic groups: Hausa-Fulani (29%),
Yoruba (21%), and Ibo (18%). CIA, supra n. 21. The Hausa-Fulani peoples are
concentrated in the North and occupy two-thirds of Nigeria's landmass. Nigeria: Equity
Restrictions, supra n. 28, at Social Conditions sect., [ 21. The Yuroba are concentrated in
the southwest while Ibos are in the southeast. Id, "Interspersed with the three main
groups are more than 200 politically weak and economically exploited ethnic minorities,
each with its own cultural traditions and values." Id.
31. See Paul A. Beckett & Crawford Young, Beyond the Impasse of "Permanent
Transition" in Nigeria, in Dilemmas of Democracy in Nigeria 1, 1-14 (Paul A. Beckett &
Crawford Young eds., U. of Rochester Press 1997); Reynolds & Flores, supra n. 9, at III Nig.
1-3. The existence of ethnic strife was made very evident early in Nigeria's history as an
independent nation. It is believed that during the colonial era, the British favored the
Northerners granting them considerable political influence and economic reprieve. Nigeria:
Equity Restrictions, supra n. 28, at History sect, [ 1 5-12]. In 1960, Britain granted
Nigeria its independence pursuant to an arrangement that assured the continued political
domination of the Muslim North. Id. In 1966, politically motivated ethnic violence erupted
through out the country, ultimately leading to a civil war. Id.
32. Reynolds & Flores, supra n. 9. at III Nigeria 2; Christian N. Okeke, International Law
in the Nigerian Legal System, 21: Cal. W. Intl. L.J. 311, 329 (1997) ("Nigeria has had at
least ten constitutions at different stages of its political development between 1914 and
1996.").
33. See Okeke, supra n. 32, at 339.
34. Reynolds & Flores, supra n. 9, at III Nig. 2.
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the ranks35 have wreaked havoc on Nigeria, thereby leaving the economy
of this potentially rich nation in total disarray.36  Through failing to
diversify Nigeria's economy, "'[successive governments have inclined
toward politically motivated overinvestment [sic] in the energy sector'"
seeking rapid returns as the nation's infrastructure remained
underdeveloped. According to the World Bank, the Nigerian
government's investments in its domestic energy facilities have not
generated significant returns on the billions of U.S. dollars poured into
them.38
Under the current constitution enacted in 1992, Nigeria's
government operates under a federal system (consisting of executive,
legislative, and judicial branches) with the existence of 589 local
governmental areas.39 In reality, Nigeria's current constitution had little
effect on the government until 1999 when the previously ruling military
junta relinquished control to civilian rule.4 ° Until that time, the military
government ruled by decree,4' dominating the law-making field with little
to no interference from the courts. 42 Although the usurpation of power
by military coups had done away with the executive and legislative
branches of Nigeria's constitutionally-provided democratic government,
the judicial branch managed to survive. 43  The court's survival was
problematic in that it was stripped of its authority to check the
legislative or executive actions of the military government. 44 In fact,
Nigeria's Supreme Court wisely avoided the issue of determining the
constitutionality of the military government's decree-making power.45
For example, in Lakanmi v. Attorney-General of Western Nigeria,4 6 the
Nigerian Supreme Court held that the Constitution remained the
35. Lewis, supra n. 17, at 311-19 (stating that petroleum smuggling and other overt
illegal activities performed by senior military officers and civilian elitist stripped Nigeria of
more than a billion dollars annually "equalling [sic] as much as 15 percent of recorded
government revenues"); see infra n. 72 (providing an example of corruption in the health
sector).
36. See generally Lewis, supra n. 17, at 319.
37. Reynolds & Flores, supra n. 9, at III Nig. 2.
38. Id.
39. Id
40. Id. at III Nig. 2-3. Nigeria's 1989 constitution called for a civilian federal government.
Id. The latest coup, which occurred in 1985, established the Armed Forces Ruling Council
lead by a military Chief of State. Id. Military rule did away with the democratic
government and abolished state and federal legislatures. Id. Although the new
constitution was promulgated under the military regime under the guise that its 1992
activation would abolish the military regime, this failed to happen. Id. Therefore, the
constitution lacked actual authority in the years between its activation and the 1999
reestablishment of democracy. Id.
41. Okeke, supra n. 32, at 339-41.
42. Id
43. Id.
44. Joseph, supran. 1, at 149-51.
45. Okeke, supra n. 32.
46. SC/58/69 (1970) (cited in Okeke, supran. 32, at 341 n. 134).
824 [Vol. 37:819
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supreme law of the land-except when the Constitution was amended
by a decree, which was supreme when in conflict with any provision of
the Constitution.47
Without the internal checks and balances afforded a democratic
government,4 dissatisfaction with the lawmaking process among the
masses could only have been expected. One Nigerian observer
commented that:
The advent of military governments in Nigeria seem to have distanced the
populace from the law-making process. Indeed, the thinking is that
decrees are promulgated at the whims and caprices of the ruling
government without due regard to stipulated procedure for law-making.
This fire brigade approach of law making under military regimes has
created the impression among some statute users that legislation is
nothing more than a publication of pronouncements of the Commander-
in-Chief or his ruling council.49
The current democratic governmentS°-consisting of the judiciary,
and a president and parliament elected in 1999 5 1-has inherited the
colossal responsibility of addressing the overwhelming economic and
health-related problems affecting the nation.52  Although the military
regime's focus on Nigeria's oil reserves took away much needed attention
from the state of the country's public health,5 3 the military regime
successfully promulgated the NHIS prior to passing the torch to the
democratically elected government."4  Since its promulgation, the
Scheme's impending implementation has sparked huge debates among
key players.5 5  For the past two years, the legislature has been
scrambling to obtain input from interested groups to determine the
efficacy of the NHIS as written.
5 6
47. Okeke, supran. 32, at 341-42.
48. See U.S. Const. arts. I-Ill.
49. Reynolds & Flores, supra n. 9, at III Nigeria 3-4 (quoting E.C.J. Azinge, Legislation:
An Appraisal of Problems and Prospects of Law-making in Nigeria, 1 Nig. J. Legis. 37
(1993)). It is questionable whether the "fire brigade approach" adopted by previous military
regimes have transcended to the civilian government. Although the text of the NHIS
Decree has not been amended, the current administration seems to communicate to the
Nigerian populace that the NHIS covers all Nigerians when it in fact does not. Sources
state that there is some controversy over the implementation of the Scheme but the text
language has no yet been amended.
50. Id.
51. Reynolds & Flores, supra n. 9, at III Nig. 3.
52. See id.
53. See What Agenda for the Sick?, supra n. 3, at Ill 7-10] (stating that despite the fact
that Nigeria is an oil exporting nation, it remains the world's 19' poorest nation and has
traditionally spent less than five percent of its budgetary allocation on healthcare); supra n.
35 and accompanying text.
54. Cote d'Ivoire Overtakes Nigeria on Health Insurance, Africa News [TI 151 (Jun. 7, 2001)
(available in LEXIS, NEWS library, AFRNWS file).
55. Ugwuadu, Stakeholders Disagree, supra n. 8.
56. The 1999 version of the NHIS excludes many Nigerians from participation and fails
to provide a mechanism to include state governments. Infra n. 58.
2002] 825
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Currently, the Scheme has not yet become fully operational.5 7 Due
to the reestablishment of republicanism, the NHIS must now jump over
legislative hurdles before being amended.5 8 The return of democracy to
Nigeria is likely to impact the revision of the NHIS because the interests
of more groups could be represented in the amendment process.
s9
However, it is questionable whether the "fire brigade law-making
approach" utilized by the military government has transcended into the
current civilian government. The current government, grappling with
the best way to implement the Scheme, has-according to some
sources -implemented social programs under the auspices of the
NHIS 60 to address perceived shortcomings of the 1999 law. Additionally,
there have been reports that the Scheme may be implemented without
the inclusion of HMOs.61 When examined against the text of the NHIS,
these implementation measures either contradict or outright ignore the
text of the 1999 NHIS. The possibility of such government action seems
dubious since the NHIS text is clear on how the Scheme should be
implemented and operated. Nonetheless, the actual text of the 1999
NHIS is yet to be amended.62
III. NIGERIAN HEALTHCARE
UNICEF has ranked Nigeria among countries with the highest
mortality in the world.6 The average life expectancy in Nigeria is fifty-
one years. 64 "The majority of Nigerians live in extreme poverty, made
57. What Hope for Health Sector in 2002?, supra n. 2, at [ql 11] (outlining the many
healthcare problems currently plaguing Nigeria's poor and stating that the NHIS "might
address these pitfalls when implemented if only [the federal] government will rise to the
challenge").
58. Ugwuadu, Making the NHIS Work, supra n. 2, at [ql 191(stating that the federal
government is yet to implement the NHIS due to the many adjustments to the draft law
needed in order to "accommodate all shades of opinion and reservations by stakeholders");
Ifeanyi Ugwuadu, Federal Government to Subsidise [sic] Health Insurance for AIDS Patients,
Africa News [9 6] (Sept. 5, 2000) (available in LEXIS, NEWS library, AFRNWS file)
[hereinafter Ugwuadu, AIDS Patients] (stating that certain provisions of the NHIS may
impinge on principles of federalism and "may certainly precipitate... rejection by the
state[ ] legislators"); Issues Before the National Assembly, Africa News [T 2] (Aug. 28, 2001)
(available in LEXIS, NEWS library, AFRNWS file) (stating that in all of 2000, the National
Assembly "was only able to pass five bill[s].... The quality of the bill[sl ... were of little
significance to the larger welfare of the people.").
59. Id.; Reps Step Down Bill on Health Scheme, Africa News (Jun. 8, 2001) (available in
LEXIS, NEWS library, AFRNWS file).
60. National Health Insurance Scheme Implemented, Africa News [9l 11] (May 8, 2001)
(available in LEXIS, NEWS library, AFRNWS file); infra n. 162 and accompanying text.
61. HMOs Risk Exclusion From Scheme, Africa News (Mar. 6, 2001) (available in LEXIS,
NEWS library, AFRNWS file).
62. See supra n. 53.
63. What Agenda for the Sick?, supra n. 3; WHO, The World Health Report: Annex Table
1 -Basic Indicators for All Member States
<http://www.who.int/whr/2OO1/main/en/annexl.htm> (accessed Jan. 28, 2002).
64. CIA, supra n. 21.
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8
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 37 [2001], Iss. 3, Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol37/iss3/5
PARICIPANT TRIANGLE
worse by a severely devastated infrastructure."65 The life of the poor has
become particularly dangerous especially because of the "lack of
sanitation and [since] inadequate access to clean water plagues nearly
all the country." 66 "Many people die from waterborne diseases and other
infectious maladies, such as meningitis and malaria."67 In 1999, an
estimated 2.7 million Nigerians were living with HIV or AIDS and an
estimated 250,000 died from AIDS. 68 Unfortunately, only about sixty-
seven percent of Nigerians have access to any form of healthcare.69
Although Nigeria's health policy is centered on primary
healthcare, ° the country's healthcare facilities are generally ill equipped
to fulfill this function especially since the lack of basic supplies and
drugs are common troubles facing them.71 During the years of military
rule, rampant corruption of the military regime72  and severe
misappropriation of allocated funds" were but some of the explanations
for the lack of resources in the health care sector. For example, one
source stated:
[Iin 1995 under the tyrannical rule of the late Gen. Sani Abacha... 5.2
per cent [sic] [of the nation's budget] was allocated to health. With this
allocation, it was expected that the healthcare delivery system in Nigeria
which had become moribund would be revamped but this allocation was
greatly misappropriated. Dr. George Opagu, president, Nigerian Medical
Association, thinks however, that the problem under Abacha, went beyond
misappropriation of funds. "He put square pegs in round holes. The
quality of leadership under him was poor; non-qualified hands like
primary school teachers, were put in charge of our health."74
65. Nigeria: Equity Restrictions, supra n. 28, at Regional & Class Divisions sect., [ 1];
see Paul Francis et al., State, Community & Local Development in Nigeria, World Bank
Technical Paper No. 336-African Region Series 9 (World Bank 1996).
66. Nigeria: Equity Restrictions, supran. 28, at Health sect. [ql 2].
67. Id.
68. CIA, supran. 21.
69. What Agenda For The Sick?, supra n. 3.
70. Marsteller & Cohen, supra n. 6.
71. Com. Serv., U.S. Embassy-Lagos, Nigeria: Used or Refurbished Medical Equipment
Intl. Market Insight Reports (Jun. 2, 2000) (available in LEXIS, WORLD library, AAIW file)
[hereinafter Medical Equipment].
72. Mark Hollingsworth & Michael Gillard, Rriton Named In Probe To Find Nigerian
Leader's Billions, Sunday Express (Sept. 10, 2000) (available in LEXIS, NEWS library,
SUNEX file). The former military government's corruption in the healthcare arena is
evidenced by the Morgan Procurement scam. Id. Two contracts, worth 111 million U.S.
dollars, were awarded to Morgan Procurement for the supply of vaccines for a Nigerian
child immunization program. Id. Morgan Procurement, an offshore company, was secretly
owned by the family of former Nigerian dictator General Sani Abacha. Id. The vaccines
were supplied to the Nigerian health ministry which was also run by the Abacha's wife. Id.
It has been reported that Morgan Procurement bought the drugs in France for less than
fifty million U.S. dollars thereby providing Abacha's family a huge profit. Id.
73. What Agenda For The Sick?, supra n. 3 (stating that the increased funds allocated to
health by Nigeria's former military dictator was greatly misappropriated).
74. Id. at [ f 10-11] (identifying government misappropriation of funds and program
mismanagement as hindrances to improving Nigeria's healthcare delivery system).
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Poor quality and high costs are also major problems in Nigerian
healthcare:
Teaching hospitals... still lack infrastructure, equipment, standard
drugs and personnel. The medical director of Ikeja General Hospital, Dr.
Oshinuga believes the critical problems are those of personnel and
infrastructure.... Even as poor a state as the teaching hospitals are,
patients are charged exorbitant rates [and]... "the bills are enough to
scare patients away."
75
Furthermore, Nigeria's population growth poses additional problems
for its healthcare delivery system. v In 1997, official reports estimated a
ratio of 6338 persons per medical facility, comparing poorly to ratios
prescribed by WHO .77
The state of Nigerian healthcare "has been deteriorating since the
early 1980s, and has severely affected the practice of medicine [and]
research... in the Nigerian health sector. "7  In an attempt to address
this deterioration, the federal government mandated the Petroleum Trust
Fund ("PTF") as a means to finance the much needed refurbishing of
hospital infrastructures and medical equipment.79  "The [PTF] was
established in 1994 to manage the gains of the new pricing of petroleum
products" and to intervene in certain key areas of the economy.8 0 Due to
deteriorating economic conditions,8 ' this federal program suffered severe
setbacks causing many PTF health projects around the nation to be left
uncompleted8 2
Currently, Nigerian healthcare is delivered through an estimated
15,500 institutions83 comprised of "general hospitals, teaching hospitals,
urban health centers, maternity homes, local health centers,
neuropsychiatric hospitals, rural health centers, mobile clinics,
dispensaries, and an assortment of training institutions."84 Healthcare
75. Id. at [ql 16] (quotations omitted).
76. Id.
77. Patricia Egbuson, Com. Serv., U.S. Embassy-Lagos, Nigeria: Medical Disposables.
Mkt. Rpts. (Jul. 1, 1997) (available in LEXIS, MARKET library, MKTRPT file) [hereinafter
Egbuson, Medical Disposables]; WHO, WHO Estimates of Health Personnel
<http://www.who.int/whosis/health.personnel/health-personnel.cfm?path=statisticsheal
th personnel&language=english> (accessed Jan. 28, 2001) (stating that in 1992, Nigeria
had 18.5 doctors per 100,000 people).
78. Egbuson, Diagnostic Equipment, infra n. 84, at Summary sect., I 1].
79. Egbuson, Medical Disposables, supra n. 77, at Market Assessment sect., [1 21.
80. Id.
81. SeeLewis, supran. 17.
82. See George Onah, Medical Directors Plead with Federal Government, Striking Doctors,
Africa News (Oct. 16, 2000) (available in LEXIS, NEWS library, AFRNWS file) [hereinafter
Onah, Striking Doctors] (mentioning medical doctors' dissatisfaction concerning the
magnitude of unfinished PTF health projects).
83. Medical Equipment, supra n. 71.
84. Patricia Egbuson, Com. Serv., U.S. Embassy-Lagos, Nigeria: Medical Diagnostic
Equipment, Mkt. Rpts., Market Assessment sect., [91 7] (Jul. 1, 1997) (available in LEXIS,
MARKET library, MKTRPT fie) [hereinafter Egbuson, Diagnostic Equipment].
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85providers are generally categorized as either public or private.
The public sector is composed of institutions that are further
categorized into three areas: primary, secondary, and tertiary healthcare
systems. 86  The primary healthcare system is operated by local
governments and encompasses "rural health centers, dispensaries,
maternity homes and clinics."87 The state governments operate the
secondary healthcare system primarily consisting of general hospitals,
whereas the federal government operates the tertiary level comprised of
teaching and specialist hospitals. 88 These public facilities provide for the
majority of the healthcare delivered to the nation.89 Nigerian public
healthcare has suffered from severe under-funding ° resulting in the
deterioration of infrastructures and lack of equipment, standard drugs,
and qualified medical personnel. 91 It is not uncommon for public
healthcare facilities to be without the bare essentials needed to dispense
any form of adequate healthcare.
2
On the other hand, within the last decade, the private sector has
witnessed the creation of high-class private hospitals purposed to service
wealthy clientele.93 These private hospitals are usually well financed
94
and are noted for being better staffed, 95 providing higher quality
services,98 and possessing more technologically advanced equipment.97
Although the cost of their services is generally beyond the reach of most
Nigerians, they still fall below the technological standards of developed





90. Ugwuadu, Making the NHIS Work supra n. 2, at [91 8].
91. What Agenda for the Sick?, supra n. 3 (discussing the lack of infrastructure,
equipment, drugs, and personnel plaguing Nigerian teaching and general hospitals).
92. See Health Sector Rehabilitation is a Priority-Uduaghan, Africa News (Oct. 10, 2000)
(available in LEXIS, NEWS library, AFRNWS file). Nigeria's Delta State commissioner for
health, Dr. Emmanuel Uduaghan, commented on the state of healthcare affairs when he
assumed office:
On assumption of office, we met hospitals without doctors, nurses, roofs, water,
electricity, beds, drugs, vaccine for measles, chicken pox, polio, tuberculosis,
meningitis and yellow fever among others.... There was also no visible
programme [sic] in place for HIV/AIDS awareness, family planning, adolescent
reproductive problems such as sexually transmitted diseases and teenage
pregnancy among others.
Id.
93. Egbuson, Diagnostic Equipment, supra n. 84.
94. Id.
95. Id. (stating that poor salaries within government hospitals causes qualified medical
practitioners to exodus to the private sector).
96. See id.
97. Medical Equipment, supra n. 71 (stating that the private sector imported 400 million
U.S. dollars worth of medical equipment in 1998 compared to the government's expected
expenditure for 2000 of 125 million U.S. dollars).
98. Nigeria: Social Conditions, supra n. 16.
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nations. 99
IV. THE NIGERIAN NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE SCHEME
The National Health Insurance Scheme ("NHIS")'0 0 promulgated by
the Federal Military government in May of 1999,01 is purposed'0 2 to
remedy some of the deep-rooted problems within the Nigerian healthcare
system. 103
The Scheme' ° 4 is designed to function as a governmental ° 5
corporate body1 0 6 that regulates the distribution of health insurance to
eligible persons and their dependants. 0 7  The NHIS sets forth an
intricate insurance system °8  in which the government executes
99. Egbuson, Diagnostic Equipment, supra n. 84.
100. Decree No. 35 (May 10, 1999) (Nig.) <http://www.nigeria-
law.org/National°/2OHealth%2OInsurance%2OSchemeO/%2ODecree.htm>.
101. Id.
102. See id. § 1(1), (stating that "[there is hereby established.., the National Health
Insurance Scheme... for the purpose of providing health insurance which shall entitle
insured persons and their dependants the benefit of prescribed good quality and cost
effective health services"). Examination of the Scheme's objectives delineated in Part 11 (5)
of the Decree also reveals the government's isolation of problems in Nigerian healthcare for
which the Scheme is to address:
5. The objectives of the Scheme shall be to -
(a) ensure that every Nigerian has access to good health care services;
(b) protect families from the financial hardship of huge medical bills;
(c) limit the rise in the cost of health care services;
(d) ensure equitable distribution of health care costs among different income
groups;
(e) maintain high standard of health care delivery services within the
Scheme;
(f) ensure efficiency in health care services;
(g) improve and harness private sector participation in the provision of health
care services;
(h) ensure adequate distribution of health facilities within the Federation;
(i) ensure equitable patronage of all levels of health care;
0) ensure the availability of funds to the health sector for improved services.
Id. § 5.
103. What Agenda For The Sick?, supra n. 3.
104. See NHIS § 1(1), <http://www.nigeria-
law.org/National%20Health%2OInsurance%2OScheme%2oDecree.htm>; supra n. 13.
105. Although the Scheme involves non-governmental participants-namely the HMOs
and healthcare providers-the regulatory oversight of the federal government, in effect,
causes the entire Scheme to undertake a governmental persona. Cf. NHIS § 6,
<http://www.nigeria-
law.org/National%2OHealth%2Onsurance%2OScheme%2oDecree.htn> (delineating the
responsibilities of the Scheme).
106. NHIS § 1(2)(a), <http://www.nigeria-
law.org/NationalO/20Health%20Insurance%20Scheme%2Decree.htm> (providing that the
Scheme "shall be a body corporate with perpetual succession and a common seal").
107. Id. § 1(1) (stating that the Scheme is purposed to provide "health insurance which
shall entitle insured persons and their dependants ... health services").
108. See Making the NHIS Work, supra n. 2, at I 51 (stating that "Itihe concept of
insurance is the basis and key to understanding the [Sicheme which is also practised [sic]
in countries like Egypt, Uganda, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, and others").
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regulatory functions'0 9 while private and public HMOs play the role of
"middlemen" between healthcare providers and insured participants. 
110
The NHIS establishes a Governing Council,"1 which is responsible
for managing and implementing NHIS provisions" 2 and instituting
policies in line with the NHIS objectives." 3 The NHIS also requires the
Governing Council to divide the country into zones and to establish
offices in each zone." 4 These Zonal Health Insurance Offices"l5 would
then be responsible for such functions as administering policies set forth
by the Governing Council," 6 maintaining a register of healthcare
providers, 117 and inspecting healthcare facilities. 118
Additionally, the NHIS also requires" 9 employers 120 and their
employees 121 to participate in the Scheme through compulsory
122
109. NHIS §§ 6, 11, 18-19, 21-22, 46-48, <http://www.nigeria-
law.org/National%2OHealth%2Olnsurance%2OScheme%2ODecree.htm>.
110. Id. § 20 (delineating the duties of an HMO under the Scheme). This provision
provides that NHIS registered HMOs have the responsibility for "(a) the collection of
contributions from eligible employers and employees... ; (b) the collection of contributions
from voluntary contributors... ; (c) the payment of capitation fees for services rendered by
health care providers registered under the Scheme...." d. § 20 (a)-(c).
111. Id.§2.
112. Id. § 7(a), (c), (e)-(i).
113. Id. §7 (b), ()
114. Id. § 21.
115. NHIS § 21, <http://www.nigeria-
law.org/National%2OHealth%2Olnsurance%20OScheme%2ODecree.htm>. Zonal Health
Insurance Offices are also identified as "Zonal Offices" within the text of NHIS. Id.
116. Id. § 22 (k).
117. Id. § 22(d).
118. Id. § 22(e).
119. Id. § 16. The requirement mentioned in the above text is limited to employers of ten
or more employees. Additionally, the language of the applicable provision appears
inconsistent with the remainder of the NHIS in that it questions the obligatory nature of
the provision: "An employer who has a minimum of ten employees may... pay
contributions to the Scheme..." Id. (emphasis added). But upon cross-reference to other
NHIS provisions, the obligation of compliance is established. See id. § 17(3) (stating that
"[a] person not liable to pay contributions... may apply to be registered as a voluntary
contributor" (emphasis added) which suggests that a category exists in which individuals
are liable to pay); see id. § 48(1)(c) (stating that the payment of contributions by employers
and their employees are compulsory).
120. See id. § 16(1) (applicable to employers of ten or more employees). Employer is
further defined as:
an employer registered under the Scheme and includes the Federal; State or Local
Government or any Extra-Ministerial Department or a person with whom an
employee has entered into a contract of service or apprenticeship and who is
responsible for the payment of the wages or salaries of the employee including the
lawful representative, successor or assignee of that person;
Id. § 50.
121. NHIS § 50, <http://www.nigeria-
law.org/National%/2OHealth%/2Olnsurance%/2OScheme%/2ODecree.htm>. This provision
states that:
employee' means any person who is ordinarily resident in Nigeria and is
employed in the service of the Federal, a State or Local Government in a civil
capacity or in any of the public services or under a contract of service or an
apprenticeship with an employer whether the contract is expressed or implied,
20021 831
13
Anarado: The HMO's Angle in the Participant Triangle: What's So Wrong with
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2001
TULSA LAW REVIEW
payment of predetermined contributions 12 3 to registered'2" HMOs. 1 25 The
NHIS also permits voluntary participation by interested persons who are
not employed in a setting in which Scheme participation is mandatory.
126
Upon being registered 127 as voluntary contributors, 12 these persons
would then be required to also pay predetermined 2 9 contributions to
Scheme-registered HMOs. The HMOs collect the contributions' 3° and in
turn pay capitation fees13 1 to registered 3 2 healthcare providers 3 3 for
services rendered to insured participants. 134 In its most basic form, the
Scheme could therefore be conceptualized as a triangle of participants
consisting of voluntary and compulsory contributors, 135 HMOs, and
healthcare providers-all of whose actions are regulated 136 by the
oral or in writing; ....
Id.
122. See supran. 119.
123. NHIS § 48(1)(c), <http://www.nigeria-
law.org/Nationa%2OHealth%201nsurance%2OScheme%2ODecree.htm>.
124. HMOs are required to be registered with the Scheme in order to participate. Id. §
19(1)-(2).
125. Id. § 19(1). The NHIS states that the term "organisation" [sic] will be used as a
shortened form for "health maintenance organization" throughout the text of the NHIS.
See id. § 50 (defining "organisation"[sic] as "any health maintenance organisation [sic]
registered under section 19 of [the NHIS] and includes institution, body corporate or a
provident association registered by the Council to utilise [sic] its administration [to] provide
health care services through health care centres [sic] approved by the Council[.]"). For the
purposes of this article, the abbreviation "HMOs" will be used to connote health
maintenance organizations.
126. See id. §§ 17(3), 48(1)(d).
127. See id. § 17(3) ("A person not liable to pay contributions under this [Scheme] may
apply to be registered as a voluntary contributor. . .").
128. See id. The definition of a voluntary contributor may be derived by a comparison of
NHIS provisions. Compare id. at § 17(3) ("[a] person not liable to pay contributions. .. "),
with i.c § 48(1)(d) ("self employed and other persons"); id. § 48(1)(c) (compulsory
contributors are employers and employees); ic. § 16(1) (application of compulsory
contribution provisions limited to employers of ten or more employees).
129. See NHIS § 48(I)(d), <http://www.nigeria-
law.org/National%2OHealth%2Olnsurance%2OScheme%2ODecree.htm>.
130. See id. § 20(b).
131. See id. § 50 (defining "capitation payment" as "a payment to a health care provider in
respect of services to be provided by him to an insured person registered by the health care
provider, whether the insured person uses the services or not.. ").
132. Healthcare providers are required to be registered with the Scheme in order to
participate. See id. § 18(2); id. § 6(a).
133. See id. § 50 (defining "health care provider" as "any government or private health
care practitioner, hospital or maternity centre [sic] registered by the Council for the
provision of prescribed health services for insured persons and their dependants under the
Scheme... 1.
134. "Insured person" is defined as "any person who pays the required contribution to the
Scheme...." Id. § 50; Id. at § 20(c) (stating one of the duties of an HMO is to pay the
"capitation fees for services rendered by health care providers registered under the
Scheme").
135. Infrann. 145-59.
136. The NHIS requires that all Scheme participants be registered. NHIS §§ 17(2)-(3), 18,
19, <http://www.nigeria-
law.org/NationalO/2OHealth%2Olnsurance/2OScheme%2ODecree.htm>. The registration
process provides a mechanism for which the government can regulate the actions of the
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General Council and its constituents.
1 3 7
V. SCHEME OBJECTIVES & THE EXCLUSIVENESS OF THE "PARTICIPANT
TRIANGLE"
Despite the commendable efforts of the NHIS drafters, the
"participant triangle" created by the Scheme precludes the majority of
Nigerians from partaking of Scheme-provided benefits,' 3 thereby
causing the NHIS to run afoul of its very own objectives.13 9 The NHIS
objectives undermined by the exclusiveness of the "participant triangle"
include the Scheme's goals to provide: healthcare access for every
Nigerian, 14° equitable distribution of healthcare cost, 14 1 and adequate
distribution of health facilities. 142
A. Exclusiveness of NI-HS
The restricted application of NHIS provisions is pronounced from
the outset in Part I, §1(1) of the Decree, which entitles only insured
persons and their dependants to Scheme-related health services. 143 The
NHIS defines an insured person as "any person who pays the required
contribution to the Scheme."' 44 Contributions 145 are required from
employees working for employers of ten or more employees and
individuals registered with the Scheme as voluntary contributors. 46
Therefore, insured persons covered under the Scheme are limited to
compulsory and voluntary contributors.
The number of Nigerians who could conceivably fall into the
compulsory contributor category is a relatively small percentage of the
Nigerian population. In 1999, Nigeria's labor force was comprised of an
estimated sixty-six million people -only fifty-two percent of the Nigerian
Scheme participants and their compliance with NHIS objectives and policies. Id. § 48.
137. The constituents mentioned in the above text refers to the Zonal Offices and all other
governmental oversight or regulatory bodies created by the NHIS. Id. § 26 (establishing a
federal Arbitration Board for resolution of complaints); i. § 46 (establishing a Standards
Committee for recommending quality assurance guidelines for HMOs and health care
providers).
138. Id. § 18 (delineating services covered under the Scheme).
139. Id. § 5 (delineating NHIS objectives).
140. Id. § 5(a).
141. Id. § 5(d).
142. NHIS § 5(e), <http://www.nigeria-
law.org/National%2OHealth%2Olnsurance%2OSchemeO/%2ODecree.htm>.
143. Id. § 1(1) (stating that the Scheme is established "for the purpose of providing health
insurance which shall entitle insured persons and their dependants benefit of prescribed
good quality and cost effective health services"). The restrictive spirit of the "participant
triangle" is also embodied within the NHIS objective to "maintain high standard[s] of
healthcare delivery services within the Scheme." Id. § 5(d) (emphasis added).
144. Id. § 50.
145. The Scheme defines a contribution as "pay[ment] to an [HMO]... and includes a
voluntary contribution." Id. § 50.
146. Supra nn. 124-34 and accompanying text.
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populace. 147 Seventy percent of Nigeria's labor force is employed in the
agriculture sector, while twenty percent is employed in the services
sector and ten percent in industry. 148 The Nigerian agriculture sector
largely consists of subsistence farming. 149 Assuming that forty percent
of the agriculture sector's labor force (or thirty percent of Nigeria's entire
labor force) 150 work for employers with ten or more employees, then only
about sixty percent' 51 of Nigeria's entire labor force may even qualify for
the compulsory contributor category. Basically, this translates to the
Scheme reaching merely thirty-one percent of Nigeria's total population-
which is a far cry from alL Nigerians.
Pursuant to the NHIS, the remainder of the country may partake of
the Scheme as voluntary contributors., 2  Voluntary contributors are
self-employed individuals and other persons 153 who are "not liable to pay
contributions under the Scheme."'4 This category of Scheme
participants would most likely be composed of independently affluent
individuals due to the improbability that the poor or even middle-class
persons would willingly assume the total cost of Scheme participation,
especially without the contribution of an employer.15 5 In a nation where
wide spread use of health insurance has historically been a distant
reality, 156 the belief that under-employed citizens will voluntarily pay for
a contingent illness is unrealistic.
As a consequence, the NHIS, through its creation of the "participant
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. See Francis et al., supra 65, at 39-48.
150. The above estimation is made by the author based on the fact that agriculture makes
up 40% of Nigeria's gross domestic product and Nigeria's agriculture sector consists mostly
of subsistence farming. CIA, supra n. 21.
151. Sixty percent of Nigeria's labor force consists of: 30% agriculture, 20% services, 10%
industry. Id.
152. Suprann. 132-34.
153. NHIS § 48 (1)(d), <http://www.nigeria-
law.org/National%20Health%2OInsurance%2Scheme%2ODecree.htm>.
154. Id. § 17 (3). Section 17 states:
A person not liable to pay contributions under this Decree may apply to be
registered as a voluntary contributor under the Scheme and shall, after being so
registered, be liable to pay the specified contributions as required under this
Decree and be entitled to the health services referred to in subsection (1) of
section 18 of this Decree.
Id.
155. See Ugwuadu, supra n. 2, at [9 51 ("Insurance among the low-income group had
[historically] been a failure because earnings among this group have always ended up in
the purchase of food. Such occurrences like illness are not usually contained in [their]
budget. [Illnesses] are often treated as emergencies.").
156. Large organizations-whether public or private-usually provide some form of
healthcare assistance. Chuke, supra n. 27, at 235-36. However, persons employed by
these organizations make up a small percentage of the total Nigerian population. What
Hope for Health Sector in 2002?, supra n. 2 (stating that 75% of Nigeria's population live in
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triangle," precludes rural dwellers, the handicapped, and the elderly
15 7
from the quality healthcare promised by the Scheme. i1 8 Unless a third
party paid their contribution, vulnerable groups-such as the
unemployed, elderly, and handicapped-would be unable to foot the bill
for Scheme participation.15 9
Scheme inclusion of these groups could possibly come by way of
federal subsidization of their contribution. The government has
announced the implementation of social programs under the auspices of
the Scheme that specifically target at risk groups. l* In May of 2001, the
Chairman of the NHIS Governing Council, Ishaya Audu, stated:
For easier and efficient implementation of the [SIcheme to effectively cover
all Nigerians, the National Health Insurance Scheme has mapped out
special programs] of operation targeted at different categories of
Nigerians. These are Formal Sector Social Health Insurance Scheme,
Community-based Social Health Insurance Scheme, Micro Social Health
Insurance Scheme, Community-based Social Health Insurance Scheme
and Permanently Disabled Persons Social Health Insurance Scheme.
[The giradual plan is... to spread NHIS [to] cover... all Nigerians in all
nooks and crannies of the country by the year 2004.161
157. See Charles Ozoemena, HIV Reps Wade into Abalaka, NMDC Row, Africa News (Jun.
16, 2000) (available in LEXIS, NEWS library, AFRNWS file). Dr. Willie Ogbeide, the
Chairman of the Nigerian House of Representatives' House Committee on Health
mentioned plans to include "the aged, handicapped and other vulnerable groups" in a bill
to amend NHIS Decree 35 of 1999. Id. The "participant triangle" excludes those who are
unemployed or can not work because "[flor you to benefit from the [Sicheme, you are
expected to contribute a small percentage of your earnings .... " How It Will Work, supra
n. 12.
158. NHIS § I(I), <http://www.nigeria-
law.org/National%2OHealth%2Olnsurance%2OScheme%2ODecree.htm> (purpose of the
Scheme is to provide health insurance which entitles "insured persons and their
dependants [to] ... good quality... health services").
159. Sola Ogundipe, Disadvantaged Groups Can Also Beneft Africa News (Dec. 5, 2000)
(available in LEXIS, NEWS library, AFRNWS file). This source states:
Dr. Sunny Kuku, Joint Chief Medical Director, EKO Hospital, Lagos is also of the
view that social insurance which can be operated as a fixed percentage of income,
requires some kind of subsidy that can be provided for low income earners by
[the] government ....
[Hie noted "It is still not clear how self-employed persons, vulnerable groups and
rural dwellers will be incorporated and the financial implication [of their
participation], but the [government's] huge financial outlays suggest[ ]
government will continue playing a major role."
Id. See What Agenda For The Sick?, supra n. 3 (Dr. George Opagu, president of the
Nigerian Medical Association, in commenting on the NHIS, states his belief in the need of
only instituting a system that places the low income masses in priority since "[tihey make
up a higher percentage of the populace").
160. Supra nn. 57-60 and accompanying text.
161. National Health Insurance Scheme Implemented, Africa News (May 8, 2001) (available
in LEXIS, NEWS library, AFRNWS file).
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In December 2001-several months after the Chairman's
statement-a conference of hospital chief executives advocated for
prompt implementation of the Scheme and "for provision of a special
fund to pay for the critical care of needy patients."162 Approximately
twenty-eight percent of the population is unemployed, three percent is
elderly, 163 and thirty-four percent lives in poverty. 164 These numbers beg
the question of whether the federal government could realistically
subsidize all persons within these groups. However, without such
subsidization, the 1999 text of the NHIS excludes vulnerable groups
from participation.
B. NHIS Objective-Healthcare Access for Every Nigerian
The first objective mentioned by the NHIS is to "ensure that every
Nigerian has access to good health care services. " 165 This objective will
become problematic if the NHIS is implemented as currently written
given that the Scheme specifically fails to cover every Nigerian. The
express extension of services to only voluntary and compulsory
contributors by the NHIS establishes the contradictory nature of this
objective. 166
Of all the NHIS provisions, this is the most controversial since the
current government has advanced the notion that the Scheme covers all
Nigerians including the elderly and handicapped. 167  As of now, the
nation desperately awaits the full implementation of the Scheme as
publicized by the federal government.'6 However, contrary to popular
belief, the language of the NHIS expressly excludes the masses 169 and
restricts partakers of Scheme services to those belonging to two
170categories: persons employed by an employer with ten or more
162. FG Advised to Shelve Privatisation [sic] of Federal Hospitals, Africa News (Dec. 7,
2001) (available in LEXIS, NEWS library, AFRNWS file) (emphasis added).
163. CIA, supran. 21.
164. Francis et al., supra n. 65, at 6.
165. NHIS § 5(a), <http://www.nigeria-
law.org/National°/%2OHealth%2Olnsurance°/%2OScheme%2ODecree.htm> (emphasis added).
166. Compare NHIS § 5(a) (providing for healthcare access for every Nigerian), with NHIS §
1(1) (limiting Scheme participation to those who have paid the required contribution); see
supra Part V.A. (discussing the exclusiveness of the Scheme).
167. Supra n. 163 and accompanying text. Current President Obasanjo "campaigned for
election on the platform of the People Democratic Party which promises free medical
services to Nigerians and... present[ation] lofl a comprehensive health policy for the
country." What Agenda for the Sick?, supra n. 3, at ['1 171. According to Mrs. Nita
Lauekata, Asst. Director Social Affairs, Ministry of Federal Capital Territory, the disabled in
Abuja (Federal Capital Territory) are all enlisted in the Scheme and are catered for free.
Menace of Street Begging, Africa News [q[ 201 (Jan. 24, 2002) (available in LEXIS, NEWS
library, AFRNWS file).
168. What Hope for Health Sector in 2002?, supra n. 2 (expressing hopes that the highly
publicized National Health Insurance Scheme might address the many pitfalls in Nigeria's
healthcare system when finally implemented).
169. See id.
170. For the sake of this article, the dependants of insured persons are included within
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employees1 l and voluntary contributors.
172
C. NHIS Objective-Equitable Cost Distribution
Another problematic objective in relation to the "participant
triangle," concerns the Scheme's aim to "ensure equitable distribution of
[healthcare] costs among different income groups."173 In application, the
spectrum of income groups represented within the Scheme would
actively preclude the cost distribution from being equitable, therefore
producing a bifurcated problem. Primarily, due to the inherent
limitation as to the income groups represented in the Scheme, 174 the
spectrum of participating income groups would fail to truly represent the
Nigerian population. 7 5 Secondarily, as a consequence, the Scheme may
require a Scheme-designated income group who does not nationally
predominate the Nigerian population, to carry the bulk of the Scheme's
Cost. 176
Inadvertently, the above problems would result in a national "shut-
out" in which unrepresented income groups would be barred from
partaking of the equitable cost distribution which the Scheme
promises. 17 7  The poor and under-employed would then be left to
continue carrying the weight of their own healthcare costs,178 while
Scheme participants benefit from reduced costs due to their pooled
resources.179 Additionally, the many non-participating individuals who
are self-employed or under-employed, yet whose incomes may be
comparable to those of Scheme participants, would not enjoy benefits
birthed from Scheme-proposed cost distribution.
D. NI-fS Objective-Adequate Distribution of Health Facilities
The NHIS mission to "ensure adequate distribution of health
the categories discussed.
171. NHIS § 16 (1), <http://www.nigeria-
law.org/Nationa%2OHealth%2OInsurance%20ODecree.htm>.
172. Id. § 17(3).
173. Id. § 5(d).
174. Ogundipe, supra n. 159 (quoting Dr. Sunny Kuku, who states, "if [the Scheme]
rellies] [only] on premiums, it would not be possible to achieve an egalitarian system
because of differences in income level....").
175. Suprann. 165-66 and accompanying text.
176. See icl.
177. See generally Joseph A. Snoe, American Health Care Delivery Systems 18-21, 55-63
(West 1998). Cost distribution by means of insurance generally results in lower costs to
the insured. Id. "The elementary practice of insurance assumes that there are many risks
in the daily affairs of men. Rather than watch as these risks overwhelm every member of
society, people come together to contribute a part of their income to unforeseen
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facilities within the Federation" 8 0 is also undermined by the existence of
the "participant triangle." In application, the distribution of health
facilities would be directly dependant upon the distribution of insured
persons,' 8 1 which in turn depends upon the distribution of HMOs. In
essence, the dynamics of the "participant triangle" precludes the survival
of the whole outside the viability of any one of the parts. For example,
imagine a region in Nigeria consisting of a conglomeration of medium-
sized villages whose populations consist primarily of self-employed
farmers and those employed in small businesses. 182 It is highly unlikely
that these people will be employed by an organization of ten or more
people. Without a sufficient number of compulsory contributors, the
viability of an HMO in that region would be questionable. l 8 In fact, a
lack of compulsory contributors in a particular region may actively
discourage HMOs from even operating in that region due to the
unlikelihood that the HMO could foster a solid participant base
comprised of mostly voluntary contributors. 184
In turn, the absence of HMOs in the region could discourage the
presence of Scheme-registered healthcare facilities. 8 5  Essentially,
without the presence of Scheme-registered HMOs, or Scheme-insured
persons for that matter, healthcare facilities may have no incentive to
become Scheme-registered themselves. 
8 6
VI. MANAGED CARE IN THE UNITED STATES
Managed care organizations currently dominate healthcare delivery
within the United States.18 7  An HMO is a type of managed care
180. NHIS § 5(h), <http://www.nigeria-
law.org/National%2OHealth%2OInsurance%2ODecree.htm>.
181. See generally Milligan, Provisions of Uncompensated Care in American Hospitals: The
Role of the Tax Code, the Federal Courts, Catholic Health Care Facilities, and Local
Governments in Defining the Problem of Access for the Poor, 31 cath. Law. 7, 23, 26-27
(1987-88) (suggesting that the financial viability of public hospitals is dependant on the
amount of paying patients and stating that for-profit hospitals remain financially viable
because "they systematically exclude the uninsured poor;" also stating that most people
use insurance to pay for hospital services).
182. Francis et al., supra n. 65, at Annex 1 (providing brief descriptions of communities
studied). The Yorro Local Government Area (LGA) in Taraba State, Nigeria, personifies the
example given above. See id. The Yorro LGA has a population of 54,000 (1991) and may
be the poorest in Nigeria. Id. According to Paul Francis of the World Bank, ninety percent
of this region's population is illiterate and agriculture is the sole occupation for most of its
residents. Id.
183. HMOs "are limited liability companies set up to pool resources of contributions for
purpose of making health services available, affordable and accessible." HMOs Risk
Exclusion from Scheme, supra n. 61. Without "resources of contributions" to pool, an HMO
can not operate. See Snoe, supra n. 177, at 55-58 (discussing the fundamentals of health
insurance).
184. See id.
185. See NHIS § 5(h), <http://www.nigeria-
Iaw.org/National%2OHealth%2OInsurance%2OScheme%2ODecree.htm>.
186. See id.
187. See Robert A. Klyman, Bankruptcy Opportunities and Pitfalls: Strategies for
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organization in which healthcare services are delivered by a restricted
group of healthcare providers to persons insured by the organization. 1
88
Although managed care has been around since the 1930s, 189 HMOs were
not formally recognized by the federal government until Congress passed
The Health Maintenance Organization Act during the 1970s.190 This Act
was passed as an attempt to curb rising healthcare costs by providing
governmental assistance for the formation of qualified HMOs.191
Although HMOs are generally attractive to American employers due
to their ability to reduce healthcare costs, 19 2 these organizations have
been targets of many lawsuits and sources of much complaint. 193 HMOs
are often blamed for restricting patient choice of healthcare providers,1
94
interfering with patient-doctor relationships, second guessing the
expertise of qualified healthcare providers, and taking unconscionable
cost-cutting measures. 9 HMO critics tend to believe that the cost-
containment policies employed by many American HMOs are the source
of most HMO complaints.
96
The introduction of HMOs to Nigerian healthcare delivery by the
NHIS will uncontrovertibly change the face of healthcare delivery in that
nation. This change may be likened unto that which occurred within the
United States upon commencement of the "managed care era."197 As the
use of managed care climaxed during the 1990s, 198 the U.S. healthcare
system witnessed an unprecedented wave of dissatisfaction among
HMO-insured persons. 9 Because of the United States' long standing
Restructuring and Unwinding Integrated Delivery Systems, 31 AHLA J. Health L. 163, 163
n. 3 and accompanying text.
188. Snoe, supran. 177, at 361 (West 1998).
189. Id. at 18, 20-21.
190. John Day, Managed Care and the Medical Profession: Old Issues and Old Tensions -
The Building Blocks of Tornorrow's Health Care Delivery and Financing System, 3 Conn. Ins.
L.J. 1, 21-22 (1997).
191. Snoe, supran. 177, at 362.
192. Id. at 28, 62.
193. David Trueman, Managed Care Liability Today: Laws, Cases, Theories, and Current
Issues, 33 AHLA J. Health L. 191, 191-93 (2000).
194. See David Orentlicher, Paying Physicians to Do Less: Financial Incentives to Linit
Care, 30 U. Rich. L. Rev. 155, 159 (1996) (stating that HMOs often "employ a full-time staff
of physicians or contract with a group or groups of physicians to provide medical services
to the HMOs' subscribers . . ." (footnotes omitted). Therefore, by being a member of an
HMO, a patient cannot use a physician of his or her choice but is limited to using
physicians within the HMO's network.).
195. Tom J. Manos, Take Half an Aspirin and Call Your HMO in the Morning-Medical
Malpractice in Managed Care: Are HMOs Practicing Medicine Without a License?, 53 U.
Miami L. Rev. 195, 218 (1998).
196. Trueman, supran. 193, at 203.
197. See generally Manos, supra n. 195, at 202-04.
198. Furrow et al., supra n. 23, at 492 (stating that during the 1990s, managed care
became "the predominant mode of health care financing in the United States"). As early as
1991, 54% of employees enrolled in employment-related health benefits plans belonged to
managed care organizations. Id. at 496.
199. See id. at 492-96 ([Ilnsured Americans, not used to health care rationing, have
become increasingly uncomfortable with the restrictions that managed care imposes on
2002] 839
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history and experience with HMOs, the healthcare environment Nigeria
may witness upon implementation of the NHIS will be discussed in the
context of American managed care principles.
VII. THE HMO's ANGLE
Implicit within the text of the NHIS is the notion that
implementation of the "participant triangle" would meet the Scheme's
goal of improving Nigeria's healthcare delivery system.20 0 Although the
use of managed care is not completely foreign to Nigeria,20 1 the Scheme's
compulsory use of HMOs in the mainstream delivery of Nigerian
healthcare suggests a belief that the use of managed care alone would
improve the state of Nigerian healthcare. °2 This notion is supported by
the fact that traditionally, the use of insurance is virtually non-existent
in securing health services. 203  For the vast majority of Nigerians,
obtaining health services is dependant upon payment for those
services. 204 Because the cost of the health services is a determinative
factor for access in a fee-for-service healthcare delivery system,205 the
206proposal for nationwide health insurance appears attractive.
A. Effect of NHIS Provisions on Nigerian HMOs
NHIS provisions may become problematic for HMOs upon
implementation of the Scheme. For example, the financial provisions of
the NHIS establish a fund (hereinafter referred to as the "Fund") from
which all the expenditures incurred by the Scheme should be defrayed.
207 In addition to federal, state, and local governments, HMOs are
enlisted as potential contributors to this Fund.2°s  Although the
applicable provision fails to mandate HMO contribution to the Fund,20 9
comparison with similar NHIS provisions suggests that future
their access to care. This discomfort has been fed by a continual diet of media coverage of
managed care disasters-instances where denial or delay of care has resulted in death or
serious injury."); see generally Manos, supra n. 195.
200. HMOs Risk Exclusion From Scheme, supra n. 195.
201. See id.; Chuke, supran. 27, at 235.
202. See HMOs Risk Exclusion from Scheme, supra n. 61 (stating that HMOs are "vital to
the successful working of the [Sicheme" and are the "pivot on which the whole programme
[sic] revolves").
203. Supran. 155.
204. See What Agenda for the Sick?, supra n. 3, at 191 16] (stating that the exorbitant rates
hospitals charge are enough to "scare patients away").
205. See Snoe, supran. 177, at 18-21.
206. See Ugwuadu, Making the NIS Work, supra n. 2, at [I 81 ("The whole concept [of
social health insurance] is... laudable, as it will present a sustainable means of funding
healthcare in Nigeria.").
207. NHIS Part IV, <http://www.nigeria-
law.org/National%20Health%2OInsurance%2OScheme%2ODecree.htm>.
208. Id. § 11(2)(a), (b).
209. IL § 11(2)(a).
840 [Vol. 37:819
22
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 37 [2001], Iss. 3, Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol37/iss3/5
PARTICIPANT TRIANGLE
governmental mandate of contribution is not impossible.21°
For example, section 7(b) of the NHIS authorizes the Governing
Council ("Council") to develop the Scheme's financial policies.211
Because the NHIS gives the Council wide discretion to make decisions
that are "necessary and expedient for the purpose of achieving the
objectives of the Scheme,"212 the sheer existence of § 7(b) suggests that
the NHIS also grants the Council the option to mandate HMO
contribution.213 In the event the Council does require HMO contribution
to the Fund, this policy would have far reaching implications affecting
the financial viability of Scheme-registered HMOs.
While the NHIS permits both private and public HMOs to be
approved and registered under the Scheme,21 4 it is unlikely that any
public HMO will contribute to the Fund. In the event public HMOs were
formed, they would most likely receive their funding from public monies.
Since these public HMOs would be conceived to bring about the
furtherance of the Scheme, it would be highly unlikely that these HMOs
would be forced to contribute to the Fund, because to do so will be self-
defeating.
In contrast, a private HMO would most likely be profit driven. If a
profit-driven organization is forced to contribute to the Fund, such a
company would be hard pressed to make up its lost revenue another
way. These private HMOs may be unable to pass their financial burden
onto insured persons or their employers because the Council sets
contribution amounts for Scheme participation.215 Private HMOs would
also be precluded from manipulating capitation fees, for these are also
Council predetermined.216
210. The NHIS uses permissive language in its financial provisions. The NHIS states:
(2) There shall be paid and credited to the fund established in pursuance of
subsection (1) of this section-
(a) such money as may be received from the health maintenance
organizations;
(b) such money as may be granted or received from the Federal, State and
Local Governments;
(c) such money as may, from time to time, be granted or received from-
(i) the organised [sic] private sector,
(ii) international or donor organisations [sic] and non-Governmental
organisations [sic]
Id. at § 11(2)(a)-(c) (emphasis added).
211. Id. § 7(b) ("Itlhe Council shall have power to... determine the overall policies of the
Scheme, including the financial and operative procedures")
212. Id. §70).
213. NHIS § 7(b), <http://www.nigeria-
law.org/National%2OHealth%2Olnsurance%2OScheme%2ODecree.htm>.
214. Id. § 19(1).
215. Id. §§ 20(0, 48(1)(c).
216. Id. § 6(d).
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B. Options for Private HMO Viability
The Scheme's preclusion of HMO price setting begs the question of
how private HMOs could become and remain profitable in the midst of
the Scheme -especially if these HMOs were mandated to contribute to
the Fund. Due to the restrictive nature of the NHIS text, private HMO's
options are quite limited. In order to remain profitable, an HMO may opt
out of Scheme participation altogether or choose cost saving measures
employed by American HMOs.
1. "Opt-out" Option
One option may be to avoid Scheme participation altogether.
However, a private HMO, which is not Scheme-registered, would be
unable to successfully compete with Scheme-registered HMOs because
the Scheme would occupy the field in health insurance. Because the
NHIS mandates that all employers of ten or more employees, and their
employees, contribute to the Scheme, the only possible clientele non-
registered HMO's could service would be those considered to be
voluntary contributors.2 17
2. U.S. Cost-Containment Options
Another option would be to institute cost-controlling methods
similar to those employed by managed care organizations within the
United States such as utilization review, gate keeping, and physician
incentives.
a. U.S. Utilization Review
Utilization review is a cost controlling strategy in which the insurer
determines the necessity and appropriateness of medical care.2 1 8 This
strategy is founded on the precept that "there are wide variations in the
use of many medical services, and ... that careful review of the use of
medical care can eliminate wasteful and unnecessary care .... 29 The
types of utilization review varies and are usually categorized according to
when the review takes place in reference to the delivery of health
220services. Most HMOs employ prospective and concurrent review
processes in which review either occurs before or during the
administration of healthcare services.Y
217. Supra nn. 147-56 and accompanying text.
218. See generally Snoe, supra n. 177, at ch. 17 (providing a general overview of utilization
review and its use by healthcare organizations); Furrow et al., supra n. 23, at § 9-9; Day,
supran. 190, at 36-43, 73-78.
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b. Gate Keeping and Physician Incentives by U.S. HMOs
Gate keeping is another cost-containment strategy employed by
222U.S. managed care organizations. Gatekeepers are essentially the
primary care physicians who administer basic health care services to
insured persons and determine when hospitalization or specialist
referral is warranted. 223 These primary care physicians are often given
economic incentives to avoid the over utilization of healthcare services.2 24
Economic incentives may come in the form of capitation arrangements in
which the physician's reimbursement is withheld by the managed care
organization until the end of the year. 225 These funds are released
provided that the physician did not over utilize other health services by
excessive referrals.2 26
c. Nigerian HMO's Application of Utilization Review
The use of utilization review by Scheme-registered HMOs is not
prohibited by the NHIS. In fact, the NHIS can be interpreted as
encouraging this cost-containment mechanism. Section 20(g) of the
NHIS requires Scheme-registered HMOs to institute "a quality assurance
system to ensure that qualitative care is given by the [healthcare]
providers."227 This provision is problematic in that it charges Scheme-
registered HMOs oversight of conflicting interests. As demonstrated in
the United States, healthcare providers and managed care organizations
generally hold divergent views on what quality care actually is.
228
Basically, what physicians and patients may consider quality healthcare,
managed care organizations may consider unnecessary and wasteful. 9
For the most part, section 20(g) authorizes HMOs to regulate and
second-guess the decisions of Scheme-registered healthcare providers
for purposes of cost containment but under the guise of "quality
assurance." Utilization review is believed by the American managed care
industry to be an effective mechanism to eliminate wasteful,
unnecessary, and possibly harmful healthcare.2 0  Therefore, it would
unsurprising if this mechanism became the "quality assurance system"
employed by most Scheme-registered HMOs.
222. Orentlicher, supran. 194, at 164-74.




227. NHIS § 20(g), <http://www.nigelia-
law.org/National%2OHealth%2Olnsurance%2OScheme%2ODecree.htm>.
228. Orentlicher, supra n. 194, at 155-65.
229. Id.
230. Snoe, supran. 177, at 401-04.
20021 843
25
Anarado: The HMO's Angle in the Participant Triangle: What's So Wrong with
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2001
4TULSA LAW REVIEW
L Nigerian HMO's Application of Physician Incentives
Additionally, the NHIS encourages HMO use of physician incentives
as a cost-containment mechanism. The NHIS specifically delineates the
spectrum of health services insured persons are allowed. 31 The NHIS
states that these services should be administered by Scheme-registered
healthcare providers "in consideration for... capitation payment[s]."232
Because the NHIS permits the HMOs to contract directly with the
healthcare providers subject only to Scheme approval of the contract
233format , the HMOs could easily include physician incentives within
these contracts.
C. Impact of Cost-Containment Strategies on the "Participant Triangle"
The NHIS can essentially be interpreted as permitting Scheme-
registered HMOs to employ cost-containment measures used by
American HMOs. This poses a problem since the use of such measures
within the U.S. is believed to have given rise to the negative environment
complained about by many HMO-insured persons.23 4
Many cost-cutting mechanisms instituted by U.S. HMOs are blamed
for producing the negative changes witnessed by the American
healthcare sector.ms Despite the difference in healthcare laws between
the United States and Nigeria, the emergence of Nigerian HMOs
employing American-like, cost-containment measures may produce a
similar dissatisfaction within Nigeria's health sector. This dissatisfaction
would emanate from the other triangle participants - namely insured
persons and healthcare providers.
VIII. SCHEME ALTERNATIVES
As opposed to implementing a mechanism employing the
"participant triangle" to improve Nigerian healthcare, perhaps Nigeria
can look to American federal programs to achieve its objectives.2
6
A. The U.S. Hill-Burton Act
In the 1940's, the U.S. government addressed the issue of access to
healthcare through the implementation of federal programs aimed at
fulfilling its "promise that no American would be without care in his or
23 1. NHIS § 18, <http://www.nigeria-
law.org/National%2OHealth%2OInsurance%2Scheme%2Decree.htm>.
232. Id. § 18(1).
233. Id. § 6(c) (stating that the "Scheme shall be responsible for... approving [the] format
of contracts proposed by the [HMOs] for all health care [sic] providers").
234. Trueman, supran. 193, at 191-96.
235. Id.
236. Cf. supra Part VII.B.2.
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her time of need."2 7  The Hill-Burton Act, formerly known as the
Hospital Survey and Construction Act of 1946,238 was designed to
accomplish two objectives. First, the program was designed to reduce
the obstacles disadvantaged "communities experienced in the building
and modernization of hospitals."2 9 Secondly, it presented a mechanism
"to provide uncompensated care to indigent citizens."24 ° These objectives
were accomplished through the establishment of a partnership between
the federal and state governments from which funds were made available
for hospital construction dependent on the hospital's twenty-year
commitment to provide a reasonable amount of free healthcare to
indigent persons. 24
B. Nigerian Application of Hill-Burton Act
With regards to the issue of rehabilitating Nigerian hospitals,
2 42
perhaps the nation as a whole may benefit from implementation of a
program similar to that of the U.S. Hill-Burton Act. The Hill-Burton Act
was relatively successful in aiding the expansion and construction of
U.S. nonprofit and public hospitals. 243 Before it was phased out, Hill-
Burton was responsible for the construction of approximately forty
percent of the beds in 6000 of U.S. nonprofit and public hospitals. 24 4 Of
course, this U.S. program cannot successfully be applied without
consideration of Nigeria's already existing healthcare system and the
economics of the nation.
The U.S. Hill-Burton Act was problematic in that its matching grant
provision precluded poor communities from partaking of the program
due to their inability to secure their local share or obtain adequate
financing.245 In the event a similar program were instituted in Nigeria
requiring the recipient governments to match the federal grant, this very
237. Milligan, supran. 181, at 12.
238. 42 U.S.C § 291 (1964).
239. Milligan, supran. 181, at 12.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. What Hope for Health Sector in 2002?, supra n. 2. One commentator states:
The persistent decline in the quality of available health care [sic] services due to
underfunding [sic] and poor maintenance of facilities is a major concern for public
health.
[E]fforts of government to improve the health of the people seem futile because of
obsolete and poor maintenance of equipment, lack of social infrastructures and
amenities.
Id. at [9I 11, 5.
243. See Milligan, supran. 181, at 13.
244. Id "These beds were the result of four billion dollars in federal grants and loans and
10.4 billion dollars in state and local matching funds from 1947 to 1974." Id. at 13 n. 32
245. Id. at 13.
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same dilemma might arise. The poorer communities may ultimately be
disadvantaged due to their inability to raise enough revenue to
participate.24 s
The feasibility of such a program, therefore, hinges not on Nigeria's
existing healthcare system but on the economics of the state and local
247governments. Since the federal government would be unable to single
handedly fund the refurbishing of all the nation's public healthcare
facilities,24 incorporation of the state and local governments in that
endeavor appears more promising. The benefit of a Hill-Burton type
program in Nigeria mirrors the bifurcated benefits envisioned by the U.S.
government: (1) providing funding for the nation's deteriorating hospitals
and (2) providing a mechanism for free healthcare for indigent citizens. 24 9
The Nigerian federal government should investigate the possibility
of instituting a program in which funds are made available to the local
and state governments for the sole purpose of refurbishing existing
public health facilities and constructing new ones. As in the Hill-Burton
Act, these funds should be only made available upon the facilities
commitment to provide a specified amount of free health care to the
poor.
IX. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the 1999 NHIS suffers from two major drawbacks.
First of all, it is too restrictive to produce national change and secondly
it permits HMOs to employ cost-containment measures that may later be
detrimental to the success of the overall Scheme. Additionally, the
current government appears hard pressed to implement the Scheme as
soon as possible though it seems questionable whether the NHIS is the
vehicle in which all of Nigeria's healthcare woes could be addressed.
The Nigerian government must reconsider how the "participant
triangle" will actually improve the overall state of Nigeria's healthcare. It
is no secret that money, and lack thereof, is the foundational basis upon
which healthcare relies. Even charitable organizations, which provide
free healthcare services to indigent populations, need money to remain
viable.25 ° Since the decrepitude of Nigeria's healthcare delivery system
has frequently been blamed on the government's lack of adequate
246. Francis et al., supra n. 65, at Annex 1 (describing Nigeria's poorer communities).
247. See Milligan, supra n. 181, at 13; Muvihill v. Julia L. Butterfield Memorial Hospital,
(1971, SD NY) 329 F. Supp. 1020, 1022-23 (stating that the Hill-Burton Act "was designed
to induce the states to assume, as state function, burden of supervising the maintenance
and construction of hospitals throughout state (citations omitted). The money is funneled
through state agencies to individual hospitals which are engaged in building projects.").
248. HMOs Risk Exclusion From Scheme, supra n. 61.
249. Milligan, supran. 181, at 13.
250. See generally Milligan, supran. 181.
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healthcare expenditure251 and its failure to follow through with proposed
252healthcare improvement programs, perhaps governmental over-
involvement in the healthcare sector would be imprudent.
In the event the Nigerian government decides that the "participant
triangle" is the best mechanism to reduce cost and improve the
accessibility and quality of Nigerian healthcare, perhaps the
government's best alternative is to leave the option of HMOs to the
marketplace.5 a The government may service the Nigerian people better
by remaining in a regulatory role without occupying the field in
healthcare insurance. Instead, the government should consider possibly
instituting programs like the U.S. Hill-Burton Act or even the U.S. HMO
Act in order to get the wheels turning towards managed care benefits.
AdoLisa J. Anarado
251. Suprann. 2-3 and accompanying text.
252. Supra nn. 79-83 and accompanying text.
253. Day, supra n. 190, at 21-22 (discussing the growth in the managed care market
caused by the U.S. state and federal governments' enactment of laws during the 1970s
that encouraged HMO growth).
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